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Note
Providing an Escape for Inner-City Children:
Creating a Federal Remedy for Educational Ills
of Poor Urban Schools
Amy J. Schmitz
These are innocent children, after all. They have done nothingwrong.1
-Johnathan Kozol

INTRODUCTION
Children in impoverished, urban areas attend dangerous
and decrepit schools, where they receive low quality education
which fails to prepare them for meaningful participation in the
community. 2 Many states, however, provide no legislative or judicial remedy for these children, who desperately need vocational and educational skills to enable them to escape from the
deprivation of their urban landscape.
Meanwhile, federal officials speak of the importance of education 3 because of its key role in creating a productive citizenry
and in ensuring the nation's strength in the global marketplace. 4 Despite such rhetoric, the federal government has failed
to set binding national educational standards 5 and its financial
contributions to education have decreased. 6 With no federal at1. JOHNATHAN KOZOL, SAVAGE INEQuALITIES: CHILDREN IN AMERICAS
SCHOoLs 40 (1991).
2. See generally id. (describing deep inequalities and inadequacies of poor
inner-city students' education).

3. See Tim NATIONAL

COMMfN ON EXCELLENCE IN EDUCATION,

A NATION AT

RISK (1983) (espousing federal concern for education). The National Commission on Excellence in Education announced that "Itihe Federal Government has
the primary responsibilityto identify the national interest in education," and
"help fund and support efforts to protect and promote that interest." Id. at 33.
4. Julie Kosterlitz, Schoolhouse Equality,NAT'L J., July 21, 1990, at 176869 (quoting one commentator who stressed a lack of binding national standards
and the "growing consensus that we need nationwide goals").
5. Id.
6. Michael Winerip, In the Inner City, a Hungry Scramble for a Few
Choice Classroom Seats, N.Y. TnsEs, Sept. 8, 1993, at B13; Deborah A. Verstegen, Financing Education Reform: Where Did All the Money Go?, 19 J.
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tention to inner-city educational problems, the futures of urban
children 7-and that of our nation-are in jeopardy. 8
This Note creates a conceptual framework for a federal judicial remedy which would enable the urban poor to attain the
quality education they need to lift themselves from the cycle of
poverty. Although federal courts may not currently view school
funding challenges favorably, 9 with political shifts in the United
States Supreme Court and the continuing decline in the quality
of inner-city education, federal courts may nonetheless entertain
school finance disputes in the future. This Note's proposal,
which federal precedent supports, will provide a compelling argument for poor urban students. In the meantime, the proposal
provides a conceptual framework which state courts can uniformly apply in addressing the unique situation of inner-city
schools. This Note presents the framework as a federal proposal
because only a federal remedy can fully meet the needs of the
inner-city students by creating a national mandate which would
ensure quality education for all urban students. 10
This Note begins by outlining the particularly egregious educational situation in poor urban areas, and explains why such
areas lack sufficient funding, and therefore offer the lowest
quality education."' This Note then describes how school dis1, 3, 12 (1993) (further explaining how federal government has dramatically cut education funding, thereby hampering education reform).
7. Tamara Henry & William M. Welch, Host of Problems Often Displace
Learning in Poverty-PlaguedSchools, L.A. TIEs, Dec. 1, 1991, at B5 (stating
"[a]t stake is the future of these children"); see also THE NATIONAL COMM'N ON
EXCELLENCE IN EDUCATION, supra note 3, at 7 (explaining that those without
proper education "will be effectively disenfranchised, not simply from the material rewards that accompany competent performance, but also from the chance
to participate fully in our national life").
8. THE NATIONAL COMM'N ON EXCELLENCE IN EDUCATION, supra note 3, at
5-7; see also Lynn A. Stout, Some Thoughts on Poverty and Failurein the Market for Children'sHuman Capital,81 GEO. L.J. 1945 (1993) (arguing that educational and broader investment, in our nation's children, is essential to our
nation's well-being).
9. Given the current composition of the United States Supreme Court it is
doubtful that a federal challenge of school funding inequities would prevail at
this time. It is necessary, however, to create a conceptual framework for a federal argument for the inner-city schools, in order to encourage political and social leaders to reconceptualize the plight of the urban poor in terms which
demand a federal remedy.
10. See Brenna Bridget Mahoney, Children at Risk: The Inequality of Urban Education,9 N.Y.L. SCH. J. Hum. RTs. 161, 211-15 (1991) (arguing for establishment of federal standards as preferable method of addressing inequality
of urban education).
11. All decision making by top school officials rests on the "conventional
wisdom" that increased funding improves educational quality. Abbott v. Burke,
EDUC. FIN.

19941

URBAN SCHOOLS

1641

tricts have attacked educational funding disparities on both federal and state levels, explaining why the federal courts have not
provided a remedy and why state remedies have been inadequate in addressing the educational plight of inner-city school
children. This Note next proposes that the issue ultimately return to the federal courts on the novel equal protection approach
of Plyler v. Doe, 12 and demonstrates how the United States
Supreme Court in San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez13 did not foreclose such a proposal. This Note concludes by describing how the equal protection proposal would
apply in order to prevent the continued marginalization of the
urban underclass.
I. WHY URBAN EDUCATION IS INADEQUATE AND

UNEQUAL
A.

THE URBAN EDUCATIONAL CRIsis

The National Education Goals Panel recently released its

third annual "National Education Goals Report," 14 which concluded that "never before has the need for comprehensive educa5
tion reform... been so critical to the future of our country."'
16
Literacy rates remain the same as they were a century ago,
575 A.2d 359, 406 (N.J. 1990). The bottom line is that "[sItaff ratios, breadth of
course offerings, teacher experience and qualifications, and availability of
equipment make a real difference in educational opportunity," and these contributors to school quality all cost money. Id. In SAVAGE INEQUALrnEs, Kozol
criticizes those who attempt to justify educational inequalities by claiming that
there is no evidence that increased funding improves educational outcomes.
KOZOL, supra note 1, at 177.
12. 457 U.S. 202, reh'g denied, 458 U.S. 1131 (1982).
13. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
14. Report Says Progress on Education Goals is Wholly Inadequate, U.S.
NEwswm, Sept. 30, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, USNWR File
[hereinafter EducationGoals]. The National Education Goals Panel is a body of
14 state and federal officials created in 1990 to set goals and monitor educational progress. Id.
15. Id. (U.S. Secretary of Education Richard Riley stating the report's
results).
16. Young adults have more difficulty with basic skills such as using a
map, understanding the newspaper or applying basic math concepts than their
counterparts of seven years ago. Id. Only forty million Americans possess the
literacy skills necessary to sign their names or "read the expiration date on a
driver's license." Bob Herbert, In America; On Spelling Kat, N.Y. TnMEs, Sept.
12, 1993, § 4, at 19. One reporter asked a sixteen-year-old New Yorker why
officials closed his school, and the child replied "bestos," proceeding to spell his
perception of asbestos "B-E-S-T-O-S." Id.
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and urban children face a multitude of barriers which make
7
learning nearly impossible.'
Education is failing throughout the United States-in both
rural and urban areas.' 8 This Note, however, focuses on urban
schools because the problems associated with concentrated poverty in central cities 19 are qualitatively different from those of
rural schools. 20 As one commentator stressed after visiting
American public schools, his deepest feeling "was simply the impression that [the] urban schools were, by and large, extraordi21
narily unhappy places."
The worst educational conditions exist in poor, inner-city
schools, 22 and this situation has been steadily declining. 23 The
children in these urban schools achieve lower levels of academic
performance than children in other areas. 2 4 A study of sixthgraders at over a thousand inner-city schools, for example, reported that "all but a handful had average reading scores more
than a year below the national average." 25 These poor educational outcomes in the inner-city schools result from the lack of
17. U.S.

GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, THE UR3AN UNDERCLASS: DISTURBING
(1990) [hereinafter URBAN UNDERCLASS]; see

PROBLEMS DEMANDING ATTENTION

also Henry & Welch, supra note 7, at B5 (describing how disadvantaged children confront so many adversities that adequate education is unattainable for
those who really want to learn).
18. See Peter B. Edelman, Symposium, Toward a Comprehensive Antipoverty Strategy: Getting Beyond the Silver Bullet, 81 GEo. L.J. 1697, 16991700, 1735 (1993) (analyzing poverty in general and noting unemployment and
low educational/vocational skills of those in rural areas).
19. See URBAN UNDERCLASS, supra note 17, at 6 (describing growing concentration of poverty in central city areas and grave problems which persist in
these urban areas); William L. Taylor, The ContinuingStruggle for Equal EducationalOpportunity, 71 N.C. L. REV. 1693, 1702 (1993) (stressing the intensification of poverty in urban areas).
20. See generally WILIAm JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED
(1987) (emphasizing the particularly egregious situation in the poor urban
areas).
21. KOZOL, supra note 1, at 4-5. Kozol focused his book entirely on the inequality and inadequacy of poor, urban schools. Id.
22. ALLAN C. ORNSTEIN & DANIEL U. LEVINE, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
FOUNDATIONS OF EDUCATION 251-53 (3d ed. 1984); see also Mahoney, supra note
10, at 161 (arguing that education in poor urban areas is of low quality).
23. See Winerip, supra note 6, at B13 (stating that the situation in innercity schools has declined over the years and describing how many parents strive
to secure seats for their children in special satellite schools).
24. 136 Cong. Rec. 14991, 14992 (1990) (discussing the Urban Schools of
America Act, § 3183).
25. ORNSTEIN & LEVINE, supra note 22, at 368. In Chicago, the 10 schools
with the lowest average ACT scores (between 8.5 and 9.8) are located in the
poor, inner-city areas while the schools with the highest averages (between 23.3
and 21.8) are in the suburban communities. Julius Menacker, Ed. D., Poverty
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qualified teachers, 26 the absence of needed educational programs, 2 7 and the existence of decrepit, 28 dangerous, 29 and overcrowded facilities. 30
Obstacles to a quality education are not only present in the
schools themselves, 3 1 but they also persist in the neighborhoods
and family conditions of poor urban children.3 2 With concentrated poverty in the inner-city comes drug abuse, hunger, poor
health care, and unstable family situations.3 3 Violence also creas aSuspect Class in PublicEducationEqual ProtectionSuits, 54 EDUC. L. REP.
1085, 1091 (1989).
26. Student-to-teacher ratios are much higher in the urban districts. See,
e.g., Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359, 399 (N.J. 1990) (stating that in New Jersey,
ratios are 61 teachers per 1000 students in urban schools and 68 teachers per
1000 students in suburban schools). The scarce teachers in the poor, urban districts tend to be the lower paid and less qualified. Id. at 399; see also Herbert,
supra note 16, at 20 (describing the situation in Los Angeles where schools "are
so short of qualified teachers that administrators are practically dragging substitutes in off the street").
27. Again, using the New Jersey example, courses offered in computer sciences, natural sciences, and foreign languages are barely existent in the poor
urban districts while they thrive in other areas. Abbott, 575 A.2d at 395-97; see
also Kosterlitz, supra note 4, at 1770 (describing tangible differences between
suburban and urban New Jersey schools e.g., 1 computer for every 8 students in
suburban school but only 1 for every 58 students in inner-city school).
28. See KozoL, supra note 1, at 14 (describing inner-city school in East
Saint Louis as a "decrepit hulk"); see alsoReform Educ. Fin. Inequities Today
(R.E.F.I.T.) v. Cuomo, 578 N.Y.S.2d 969, 972 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991) (describing
urban New York school which "crowds 40% of its 9,500 students into rapidly
deteriorating portable classrooms"), affd, 606 N.Y.S.2d 44 (N.Y. 1993).
29. For example in New York, schools were unable to open on time this fall
because of asbestos danger. Susan Chira, Schools Open Soon (With Luck); to
More Trouble Than Usual, N.Y. TnEs, Sept. 5, 1993, § 4, at 5.
30. See, e.g., McDuffy v. Secretary of the Executive Office of Educ., 615
N.E.2d 516, 521 (Mass. 1993) (describing over-crowded classrooms in urban
Massachusetts schools); Abbott, 575 A.2d at 397 (describing inner-city schools
where students eat lunch in boiler room or first floor corridor, and teachers hold
remedial classes in former bathroom and other classes in converted coal bin).
31. Increased school funding will not renew the inner-cities and cure all
social ills. It will, however, give the innocent children who reside in these areas
the essential tools of education to aid them in their escape from the cycle of
poverty.
32. See generally Edelman, supra note 18, at 1736 (describing many
problems associated with concentrated poverty-crime, violence, drug abuse,
few role models, etc.); Henry & Welch, supra note 7, at 5 (describing how "valuable teaching time" must be used for instruction on "needs more basic than education: decent meals, clean clothes, a pair of shoes, a responsible adult").
33. See NATIONAL COMM'N ON CHILDREN, BEYOND RHETOmc: A NEW AMERIcAN AGENDA FOR CHILDREN AND FAsmuS 181-84 (1991) (describing grave social
problems in poor urban areas and finding that children starting life in most
adverse conditions, who have most need for quality education, receive worst
education).
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ates a significant barrier to quality education in city schools
where "just getting children to school is a victory."34 These conto grave discipline problems3 5 and to
ditions further contribute
36
high drop-out rates.
While economic class explains many of the problems facing
city schools, 37 those concentrated in urban areas also tend to be
racial minorities. 38 Racial strife and shortages of bilingual services add to the many educational disadvantages which minority
students face in the urban schools. 3 9 Regardless of their racial
background, however, urban disadvantaged children become
part of the decaying landscape of the inner-city. 40 Most tragic is
that the state denies them the only leverage which could lift
34. Henry & Welch, supra note 7, at 5. Violent crime in the inner-cities
increased by 1,076,870 incidents (128%) between 1972 and 1991. U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, CRImE REPORTS FOR THE UNITED STATES 58 (1992), cited in Edelman,
supra note 18, at 1699 n.8; see also James A. Maloney, Comment, Constitutional Problems Surroundingthe Implementation of "Anti-Gang"Regulations in
the Public Schools, 75 MARQ. L. REv. 179, 179-82 (1991) (describing violent
presence of gangs in urban areas and stressing grave problems that gangs create for public education).
35. See, e.g., Education Goals, supra note 14 (reporting that majority of
10th graders have difficulty learning due to misbehavior of other students);
Henry & Welch, supranote 7, at 6 (quoting one teacher who lamented: "[i]t does
take away from what you teach the kids because you're so busy trying to be a
mother and a father and teach them and everything").
36. Dropout rates are the highest among students in poor urban schools:
for example, from 1987 to 1989, the rate was 6.2% in central cities, 3.7% in
suburbs, and 4% in rural areas. Henry & Welch, supra note 7, at 7. Dropout
rates in Chicago and Detroit have been as high as 40% in recent years. NATIONAL COMM'N ON CHILDREN, supra note 33, at 180.
37. Edelman, supra note 18, at 1740-41 (describing the situation of concentrated poverty and how it greatly affects minorities, but emphasizing that the
underlying problem is one of class).
38. For example, the poor, urban school population of Chicago is 88% minority. Menacker, supra note 25, at 1090; see also Sheff v. O'Neill, 609 A.2d
1072, 1074 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1992) (poor urban schools of Hartford alleging
racial and economic segregation where minority students comprised 90% of urban school population).
39. See, Reform Educ. Fin. Inequities Today (R.E.F.I.T.) 578 N.Y.S.2d at
972 (stating that in one New York school district in early 1990's, 1000 students
needed special services for limited English proficiency).
40. E. Douglass Williams & Richard H. Sander, The Prospectsfor "Putting
America to Work" in the Inner City, 81 GEO. L.J. 2003, 2003 (1993). In 1956, the
Governor's Commission on the Los Angeles Riots described the situation of the
urban poor in Los Angeles as a "spiral of failure" due to inadequate education.
CALIFORNIA GOVERNOR'S COMM'N ON THE Los ANGELES RIOTS, VIOLENCE IN THE
CrrY-AN END OR A BEGINNING? 5-6 (1965), cited in Williams & Sander, supra.

The spiral of poverty for the urban poor persists with more severity than ever
before. Williams & Sander, supra at 2003; see also MICHAEL J. DEAR & JENNIFER R. WOLCH, LANDSCAPES OF DESPAIR (1987) (describing service dependency
of inner-city poor); Jacob A. Riis, The Children of the Poor, in THE POOR IN
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them from the impoverished underclass-an adequate, equal
41
education.
B.

POOR URBAN CHILDREN RECEIVE THE LOWEST QUALITY
EDUCATION BECAUSE THEY RECEIVE THE LEAST
FUNDING

School funding relies heavily on local government revenues,
particularly local property taxes. 4 2 Property-rich districts 43 can
tax at low rates and yield high levels of revenue while propertypoor districts would have to impose much higher tax rates in
order to raise equivalent revenues. The residents of poor dis-

tricts,4 4 however, are especially unwilling and unable to pay

higher taxes 45 and their schools are therefore unable to generate
sufficient funds to provide for quality education.4 6 As a result,
school finance inadequacies arise most often in these situations
47
of "municipal overburden."
GREAT Crrirs 86 (Arno Press Inc. eds., 1971) (describing cycle of poverty which
trapped children in 1800s and continues to hold them hostage).
41. See Edelman, supra note 18, at 1723, 1737 (describing how unending
cycle of poverty entraps poor inner-city children because they are unable to attain quality education, which would enable them to escape poverty). As Martin
Luther King, Jr. said, "it's a cruel jest to say to a bootless man that he should
lift himself by his own bootstrap." Stephen Loffredo, Poverty, Democracy and
ConstitutionalLaw, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1277 (1993) (quoting Martin Luther
King, Jr.).
42. In Oregon, for example, local revenues accounted for 78% of school
fimding in the middle 1970s. Olsen v. State, 554 P.2d 139, 140 (Or. 1976).
Texas's school finance scheme derived 42% of its fimding from local revenue in
1989. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 392 (Tex. 1989)
(Edgewood 1).
43. This Note uses the term "property-rich" to refer to districts in which
the property is more valuable and "property-poor" districts are those in which
the property is much less valuable.
44. See Edgewood I, 777 S.W.2d at 392 (describing how school spending
inadequacies plagued poor districts in which property values were 700 times
lower than in wealthier areas).
45. See Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71, 78 (Wash. 1978).
Washington's school financing system relied on local, voter-approved special excess levies; therefore poor, urban districts were unable to raise sufficient school
funds because local tax initiatives often failed. Id.
46. See Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299, 304 n.5 (Minn. 1993) (describing
how poor districts would have to levy taxes at three to five times higher rate
than wealthier districts to obtain equivalent amount of funds); Fair Sch. Fin.
Council, Inc. v. State, 746 P.2d 1135, 1138 (Old. 1987) (explaining how property
poor districts levied taxes at the highest rates allowable by law and were unable to raise revenue equal to that raised by property rich districts taxing at
lower rates).
47. The term "municipal overburden" refers to the plight of inner-city
school districts in which scarce tax revenues barely cover the high costs of ur-
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Because huge disparities often exist between inher-city districts and the districts in the rest of the state, the vast majority
of school finance cases involve urban schools 48 which are unable
to raise sufficient funds to provide students with an adequate or
equal education. 4 9 New Jersey's wealthier school districts, for
example, spent forty percent more per pupil than its poor, urban
school districts in 1989.50 Indeed, as compared with rural
schools and especially with suburban schools, inner-city schools
suffer unique problems. 51 The confluence of exploding classroom populations, poverty, high crime rates,5 2 and more expensive government services creates a singularly high demand for
local tax revenues, 53 leaving little money available for educaban governmental services, and little money is left for education. Robinson v.
Cahill, 355 A.2d 129, 138 (N.J. 1976).
48. Courts have heard only two cases challenging the constitutionality of
funding disparities which strictly affect rural schools. See McDaniel v. Thomas,
285 S.E.2d 156, 173 (Ga. 1981); Tennessee Small Sch. Sys. v. McWherter, 851
S.W.2d 139, 144 (Tenn. 1993). Rural schools suffer due to lack of taxable industry, low property values, and little state aid for equalization. Id. Nonetheless,
rural districts escape the burdens of the higher costs and the extreme social
problems experienced by inner-city school districts. See supra notes 22-41 and
accompanying text.
49. See Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971) (en banc); Serrano v.
Priest, 557 P.2d 929 (Cal.) (en banc) (naming students in Los Angeles as plaintiffs), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 907 (1977); Sheff v. O'Neill, 609 A.2d 1072, 1074
(Conn. Super. Ct. 1992) (alleging harm to inner-city Hartford students through
racial and economic segregation, and denial of equal education due to school
financing system); Hornbeck v. Sommerset County Bd. of Educ., 458 A.2d 758,
764-65 (Md. 1983) (naming school district of Baltimore City as one of primary
plaintiffs); McDuffy v. Secretary of the Executive Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d
516, 518-21 (Mass. 1993) (naming districts from both cities and smaller towns
as plaintiffs but identifying inner-city schools as experiencing the most difficulties); Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359, 380 (N.J. 1990) (naming districts in Newark, Trenton, and Jersey City with lowest expenditures per student as
plaintiffs); Reform Educ. Fin. Inequities Today (R.E.F.I.T.) v. Cuomo, 578
N.Y.S.2d 969, 969 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991) (naming districts in New York City,
Buffalo, Rochester, and Syracuse as lead plaintiffs for class); Board of Educ. v.
Walter, 390 N.E.2d 813 (Ohio 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1015 (1980) (naming
urban plaintiff class); Danson v. Casey, 399 A.2d 360 (Pa. 1979) (naming Philadelphia students as leading plaintiffs); Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1. v. State, 585
P.2d 71 (Wash. 1978) (naming Seattle as plaintiff).
50. Abbott, 575 A.2d at 383; see also Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby,
777 S.W.2d 391, 392 (Tex. 1989). Among Texas school districts, expenditures
per pupil ranged from $2,112 to $19,333, with poor urban districts at the greatest disadvantage. Id.
51. See Paul E. Peterson, The Urban Underclass and the Poverty Paradox,
in THE URBAN UNDERCLASS 3, 3 (Christopher Jencks & Paul E. Peterson eds.,
1991) (describing the unique plight of the urban Underclass and emphasizing
that the most dangerous levels of poverty infect the central cities).
52. See supra notes 30, 32-35 and accompanying text.
53. Hornbeck, 458 A.2d at 764-67.
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tion.54 This funding shortage particularly devastates inner-city
schools that often55 serve more students with special needs than
do other schools.
II. PAST APPROACHES TO REMEDY SCHOOL FINANCE
INEQUITIES
A. FEDERAL JuDIcIAL TREATMENT
Federal courts analyze legislative distinctions in the educational arena under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 56 Under traditional equal protection
analysis, like that employed by the United States Supreme
Court in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 5 7 courts view factors in isolation to determine whether the
legislative distinction limits a "fundamental constitutional
right" or involves a "suspect" classification.5 8 If the distinction
implicates such a classification or interest, courts apply strict
scrutiny which requires the state to prove a compelling governmental purpose that justifies the discrimination. 59 If the legislation involves no suspect classification or fundamental right,
courts apply rational basis review, upholding distinctions rationally related to a legitimate state purpose. 60 Federal courts,
such as the Supreme Court in Plyler v. Doe,6 ' also employ a
third standard, "intermediate" or "heightened" scrutiny, 6 2 when
specific circumstances create injustice but do not fit neatly in
the "two-tiered" equal protection model. 6 3 Under heightened
54. See id. at 764 (explaining how "municipal overburden" severely limits
funds available for quality education); Abbott, 575 A.2d at 383 (describing how
poor urban districts with high percentages of minorities must shoulder a higher
tax burden, yet have little to spend on education).
55. See Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359, 383 (N.J. 1990) (demonstrating how
inner-city students have greater needs due to higher crime rates, language barriers, broken families, etc., but the city schools have the least money to spend);
see also Board of Educ. v. Walter, 390 N.E.2d 813, 827-28 (Ohio 1979) (Locker,
J., dissenting), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1015 (1980). Justice Locker, dissenting
from the judgment upholding Ohio's school finance system, stressed the particular educational problems associated with urban malaise (cramped facilities,
discipline problems, etc.). Id.
56. 3 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NowAK, TREATISE ON CONsTrruTIONAL LAw: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 18.45 (2d ed. 1992).

57. 411 U.S. 1, reh'g denied, 411 U.S. 959 (1973).
58.

3 ROTUNDA & NOwAK, supra note 56, § 18.3, at 15-16.

59. Id.
60. Id. at 14, 27.
61. 457 U.S. 202, reh'g denied, 458 U.S. 1131 (1982).
62.
63.

3 ROTUNDA & NOwAK, supra note 56, § 18.3, at 16-19.
Id. at 16.
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scrutiny, courts uphold a legislative distinction only if it64is substantially related to an important government interest.
1. San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez:6 5
Traditional Federal Equal Protection Analysis
The United States Supreme Court has only addressed the
issue of school funding disparities once, in San Antonio Independent School Districtv. Rodriguez.6 6 The plaintiffs in Rodriguez claimed that Texas's unequal public education financing
scheme violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment under strict scrutiny review. 6 7 The Court rejected
the equal protection claim, 68 holding that education is not a fundamental interest 6 9 and refusing to recognize a suspect class
based on wealth alone. 70 With no fundamental interest or susTexas's
pect classification involved, the Supreme Court upheld
71
school financing system under rational basis review.
a. Education as a Fundamental Interest
The Rodriguez Court viewed education as a very important
state prerogative. 72 Such a conclusion flows naturally from education's essential function in a democratic society. 73 The unanimous Court in Brown v. Board of Education74 clearly stated that
"education is perhaps the most important function of state and
local governments... [and] it...75is a right which must be made
available to all on equal terms."
64. Id. at 17.
65. 411 U.S. 1, reh'g denied, 411 U.S. 959 (1973).
66. See 3 ROTUNDA & NowAK, supra note 56, § 18.45, at 511.
67. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 4-6.
68. Id. at 55. The Court found that the Texas schools adequately educated
students and the primary distinguishing attributes of wealthier schools were
"lower pupil-teacher ratios and higher salary schedules." Id. at 36-37, 46.
69. Id. at 33-37.
70. Id. at 32-33.
71. Id. at 44-55. The Court found that unequal funding bore a rational
relationship to the legitimate state purpose of promoting local control over tax
dollars spent in the individual school districts and allowing citizens to devote
more money to the education of their own children. Id. at 49-50.
72. See id. at 30.
73. See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986)
(describing education as necessary for "inculcation [of] fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political system") (quoting Amback v.
Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76-77 (1979)); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221
(1972) (presenting State's argument that education is essential "to prepare citizens to participate effectively and intelligently in our open political system").
74. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
75. Id. at 493.
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The Rodriguez Court found, however, that education is not a
"fundamental interest" that triggers strict scrutiny equal protection analysis,7 6 because the Federal Constitution does not expressly provide for a right to education.7 7 Nevertheless, the
Court did not "foreclose the possibility 'that some identifiable
quantum of education is a constitutionally protected prerequisite to the meaningful exercise of either [the right to speak or
the right to vote]. '"'78 The Supreme Court therefore acknowledged the existence of a7 9minimal level of education to which all
Americans are entitled.
b.

Poverty as a Suspect Class

According to the Supreme Court's theory of suspect class
analysis announced in United States v. CaroleneProducts Co.,s °
discrimination creates a suspect classification when the unequal
treatment restricts the political process by inflicting a burden on
"discrete and insular minorities" which lack the political power
to bring about the repeal of harmful legislation.,' The Court in
Rodriguez thus held that wealth alone does not create a suspect
76. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 33-35. But see generally Mahoney, supra note
10 (arguing that education should be a fundamental interest under the Constitution because it is essential for meaningful exercise of other constitutional
rights such as freedom of expression).
77. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 33-35.
78. Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 284 (1986) (quoting Rodriguez, 411
U.S. at 36-37). The Rodriguez Court, like the PapasanCourt, did not determine
whether there is a right to a minimally adequate education under the United
States Constitution because it found that Texas provided "adequate" education.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 36-37.
79. See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 36-37. The Court has never defined a right
to a minimally adequate education, and therefore the issue remains unsettled.
80. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
81. Id. at 152-53 n.4; see also Lea Brilmayer, Carolene, Conflicts, and the
Fate of the "Insider-Outsider,"134 U. PA. L. REv. 1291, 1291-98 (1986) (describing the democracy-centered theory of equal protection review).
The Supreme Court recently stressed again the democratic underpinnings
of the Equal Protection Clause in Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990). In Austin, the Court applied strict scrutiny analysis to an Equal Protection challenge to a Michigan statute which prohibited
corporations, but not unincorporated associations or media corporations, from
using general corporate funds in support of or opposition to candidates in election for state office. Id. at 666, 668. The Court upheld the prohibition on political expenditures because of the substantial state interest in preventing
concentrated wealth from wielding disproportionate political power. Id. at 65960. The Austin Court therefore provided protection for the disadvantaged from
the disproportionate power of the wealthy. See id at 668; see also Loffredo,
supra note 41, at 1285-86, 1371-87 (arguing that Austin teaches that wealthbased distribution of political power is invalid, therefore heightened scrutiny
should apply to wealth-based classification).
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category do not comclassification because the poor as a general
82
prise a "discrete and insular minority."
The Rodriguez Court did not address the question of
whether discrimination "against any definable category of 'poor'
people" could claim suspect class protection for purposes of challenging school funding disparities.8 3 The plaintiffs in Rodriguez
provided no "definitive description of the classifying facts or delineation of the disfavored class." 8 4 The Court, therefore,
seemed to invite a case in which the complaining impoverished
class could define their particular plight in identifiable terms beyond simply family wealth and educational expenditures. 85
2. Plyler v. Doe:86 A Novel Approach to Federal Equal
Protection Review When Education Is at Stake
Ten years after the Rodriguez decision, the Supreme Court
protected the right to education 8 7 of illegal aliens in Plyler v.
Doe.8 8 In Plyler, illegal aliens challenged a Texas statute that
authorized school districts to deny enrollment and withhold
state funds for the education of children not "legally admitted"
into the United States. 89 Although the Court found that educaright"90 and illegal aliens are not a
tion is not a "fundamental
"suspect class,"91 the Court applied heightened scrutiny under
held unconstitutional the dethe Equal Protection Clause 92 and
93
nial of free education to aliens.
82. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 24-27.
83. Id. at 25.
84. Id. at 19. The plaintiffs brought the action on behalf of "poor" school
children residing in school districts with a low property tax base. Id. at 5.
85. See id. at 19-20.
86. 457 U.S. 202, reh'g denied, 458 U.S. 1131 (1982).
87. Id. at 230. But see Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Sch., 487 U.S. 450
(1988). In Kadrmas, the Court upheld a bus user fee applying rational basis
equal protection review because the fee did not effect a denial of education and
did not harm a definable class of poor. Id. at 458-59. The Court also relied on
the fact that a school board could waive the transportation fee for indigent children. Id. at 460.
88. 457 U.S. at 205.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 223 (citing San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.1,
35 (1973)).
91. Id. at 219 n.19.
92. Instead of applying the rational basis review applied in Rodriguez, the
Plyler court applied heightened scrutiny-whether the discrimination "furthers
some substantial goal of the State." Id. at 224.
93. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 230. The Court found that the alleged purposes of
protecting Texas from an influx of illegal aliens, and of shielding the state from
higher educational costs were not substantial state goals which warranted de-
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The Court reasoned that although education is not a fundamental right, it plays a fundamental role in our society.9 4 Denying public education to illegal aliens would "impose[] a lifetime
hardship on a discrete class of children not accountable for their
disabling status."9 5 Justice Brennan concluded, in the opinion
of the Court, that the state had an overriding interest in
preventing the creation of an illiterate underclass which would
increase the "problems and costs of unemployment, welfare, and
crime."9 6 Justice Blackmun concurred, clarifying that the "complete denial" of education effectuated by the Texas statute rendered it unconstitutional.9 7 Nonetheless, like Justice Brennan,
he based his reasoning in the prevention of "permanent class
distinctions."9 8
Moreover, although the Plyler Court did not view illegal
aliens as a suspect class, it focused on the importance of eliminating state-created obstacles to social or political participation
for a particular group. 99 The Court granted the illegal aliens
special constitutional protection not only because of the importance of education, but also because denial of education would
marginalize them from political participation if they later became United States citizens. 0 0 The Court therefore acknowledged the vital importance of education for children peculiarly
disadvantaged.
Plyler represents a novel approach to federal equal protection analysis that escapes the rigid confines of traditional "twotiered" equal protection review.' 0 ' The Plyler Court chose not to
nial of education to illegal aliens. Id. at 228-29. The denial of education therefore failed to withstand heightened scrutiny because it did not further a
"substantial state interest." Id. at 230.
94. Id. at 221.
95. Id. at 223.
96. Id. at 230. The Court stated that the Equal Protection Clause stands
for "the abolition of governmental barriers presenting unreasonable obstacles to
advancement on the basis of individual merit." Id. at 222.
97. Id. at 235 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (distinguishing Rodriguez).
98. Plyler,457 U.S. at 234 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Blackmun stressed
that denial of education is unconstitutional because it places one group at "a
permanent and insurmountable competitive disadvantage." Id. Justice Powell
also concurred with Justice Brennan's plurality opinion, distinguishing Plyler
from Rodriguez because Plyler involved a complete denial of education that
"threaten[ed] the creation of an underclass of future citizens." Id. at 239, 239
n.3 (Powell, J., concurring).
99. Id. at 230.
100. Id. at 229-30.
101. See supra notes 57-60 and accompanying text (describing the twotiered equal protection analysis which requires a finding of a fundamental interest or a suspect classificationin order to apply strict scrutiny); see also infra

1652

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 78:1639

examine the right denied and the status of the complainants in
isolation in order to find a "fundamental interest" or a "suspect
classification" as required under the two-tiered approach. The
Court instead examined the confluence of the children's peculiar
disadvantage due to their status and the importance of education to minimize those disadvantages, thus justifying
applica02
tion of heightened scrutiny to the discrimination.1
B.

STATE COURT TREATMENT OF THE SCHOOL FINANCE ISSUE

1. School Finance Since Rodriguez: A State Court Issue
Dissatisfaction with funding inequities has become more
prevalent after the decision in San Antonio Independent School
District v. Rodriguez; schools in twenty-eight states have challenged their states' funding systems since 1972.103 The Rodriguez decision did not foreclose all possible federal theories for
notes 160-162 and accompanying text (explaining that state courts also tend to
approach equal protection review in same traditional manner).
102. "[T]hese cases demonstrate the wisdom of rejecting a rigidified approach to equal protection analysis." Plyler, 457 U.S. at 231 (Marshall, J., concurring) (supporting Justice Brennan's opinion, but writing separately to
emphasize that class-based denial of public education contravenes the Equal
Protection Clause, and thereby disagreeing with the majority in Rodriguez).
103. Dupree v. Alma Sch. Dist. No. 30, 651 S.W.2d 90 (Ark. 1983); Serrano
v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971) (en banc); Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929
(Cal. 1977) (en banc), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 907 (1977); Lujan v. Colorado State
Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005 (Colo. 1982); Sheffv. O'Neill, 609 A.2d 1072 (Conn.
Super. Ct. 1992); McDaniel v. Thomas, 285 S.E.2d 156 (Ga. 1981); Idaho
Schools for Equal Educ. Opp. v. Evans, 850 P.2d 724 (Idaho 1993); Blase v.
State, 302 N.E.2d 46 (Ill. 1973); Rose v. Council for Better Educ., 790 S.W.2d
186 (Ky. 1989); Hornbeck v. Somerset County Bd. of Educ., 458 A.2d 758 (Md.
1983); McDuffy v. Secretary of the Executive Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516
(Mass. 1993); Milliken v. Green, 203 N.W.2d 457 (Mich. 1972), vacated, 212
N.W.2d 711 (Mich. 1973); Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299 (Minn. 1993); Helena
Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 769 P.2d 684 (Mont. 1989), amended, 784
P.2d 412 (Mont. 1990); Gould v. Orr, 506 N.W.2d 349 (Neb. 1993); Abbott v.
Burke, 575 A.2d 359 (N.J. 1990); Reform Educ. Financing Inequity Today
(R.E.F.I.T) v. Cuomo, 578 N.Y.S.2d 969 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991); Britt v. North
Carolina State Bd. of Educ., 357 S.E.2d 432 (N.C. App.), review denied, 361
S.E.2d 71 (N.C. 1987); Board of Educ. v. Walter, 390 N.E.2d 813 (Ohio 1979),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1015 (1980); Fair Sch. Fin. Council, Inc. v. State, 746 P.2d
1135 (Ol. 1987); Coalition for Equitable Sch. Funding, Inc. v. State, 811 P.2d
116 (Or. 1991) (en banc); Danson v. Casey, 399 A.2d 360 (Pa. 1979); Richland
County v. Campbell, 364 S.E.2d 470 (S.C. 1988); Tennessee Small Sch. Sys. v.
McWherter, 851 S.W.2d 139 (Tenn. 1993); Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby,
777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989), vacated in part, 804 S.W.2d 491 (Tex. 1991); Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71 (Wash. 1978); Pauley v. Kelly, 255
S.E.2d 859 (W. Va. 1979); Pauley v. Kelly, 324 S.E.2d 128 (W. Va. 1984); Kukor
v. Grover, 436 N.W.2d 568 (Wis. 1989); Washakie County Sch. Dist. No. 1 v.
Herschler, 606 P.2d 310 (Wyo. 1980), cert. denied sub nom., 449 U.S. 824 (1980).
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recovery 10 4 and plaintiff school districts represent distinct fac-

tual situations.' 0 5 Nonetheless, these districts have not argued
their cases in federal courts because of the Rodriguez plaintiffs'
failure to obtain a remedy under traditional equal protection
analysis. 10 6 Plaintiffs thus challenge school finance disparities
0 7
primarily on state constitutional grounds.'
2.

The States' Insufficient Treatment of School Funding
Disparities in the Impoverished Inner-Cities

Poor school districts challenge their states' school finance
systems under two theories: state equal protection and the education provisions of the state constitutions.1 0 8 Despite these
possible theories for recovery, many state courts have provided
no remedy to plaintiff districts. 10 9 Other courts which have confronted the school funding issue have applied ad hoc analysis
and have ordered noncomprehensive remedies." 0
Consequently, state courts hearing school finance disparities cases
104. See supra notes 94-102 and accompanying text (explaining Plyler
Court's novel approach to equal protection review when right to education is at
stake); see also supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text (explaining how Rodriguez decision seemed to invite constitutional challenge by plaintiff school districts which could delineate their status in identifiable terms beyond simply
family wealth).

105. See supra notes 22-30 and accompanying text (stressing increasing educational deficiencies of inner-city schools).
106.

See supra notes 66-71 and accompanying text (explainingRodriguez re-

jection of equal protection claim).
107. States may provide greater constitutional protection under their constitutions and most state constitutions provide for a right to education; therefore
poor school districts called on state courts to remedy the school funding disparities. John F. Watson, The Cause,Effect and ConstitutionalConsequence of Unequal Funding: PublicEducationin Illinois, 26 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 399, 410-12

(1993).
108. Id. at 410.
109. Shofstall v. Hollins, 515 P.2d 590 (Ariz. 1973) (en banc) (upholding disparate funding systems); Lujan v. Colorado State Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005
(Colo. 1982) (en banc) (same); McDaniel v. Thomas, 285 S.E.2d 156 (Ga. 1981)
(same); Thompson v. Engelking, 537 P.2d 635 (Idaho 1975) (same); Skeen v.
State, 505 N.W.2d 299 (Minn. 1993) (en banc) (same); Gould v. Orr, 506 N.W.2d
349 (Neb. 1993) (same); Britt v. North Carolina State Bd. of Educ., 357 S.E.2d
432 (N.C. App.), review denied, 361 S.E.2d 71 (N.C. 1987) (same); Fair Sch. Fin.
Council, Inc. v. State, 746 P.2d 1135 (Okla. 1978) (same); Coalition for Equitable Sch. Funding, Inc. v. State, 811 P.2d 116 (Or. 1991) (en banc) (same); Richland County v. Campbell, 364 S.E.2d 470 (S.C. 1988) (same); see also infra note
111 (citing additional cases in which states upheld particularly disparate funding systems which burdened poor inner-city school districts).
110. See infra notes 112-115 and accompanying text (describing noncomprehensive remedies); notes 131-136 and accompanying text (demonstrating ad
hoc analysis).
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have not responded to the educational ills of impoverished, urban students.
Failure to Provide Any Remedy or to Create an Adequate
Remedy for Inner-city Students
Many courts have upheld their states' inequitable school
funding schemes,"' and those courts which have held their
states' financing systems unconstitutional1 2 have ordered varied, uncertain, and often inadequate remedies." 3 Due to political and jurisprudential concerns, even courts which have
acknowledged the existence of glaring funding disparities in
poor, urban school districts 1 4 have been reluctant to order any
remedy or to grant progressive remedies. 1
Impoverished urban school children in New York, for example, face a bleak situation. 1 6 Students cannot achieve their
a.

111. See, e.g., Hornbeck v. Somerset County Bd. of Educ., 458 A.2d 758 (Md.
1983); Reform Educ. Fin. Inequities Today (R.E.F.I.T.) v. Cuomo, 578 N.Y.S.2d
969 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991); Board of Educ. v. Walter, 390 N.E.2d 813 (Ohio
1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1015 (1980); Danson v. Casey, 399 A.2d 360 (Pa.
1979); Kukor v. Grover, 436 N.W.2d 568 (Wis. 1989). These cases upheld school
finance systems in cases involving poor urban plaintiffs who received inadequate or unequal education.
112. See, e.g., Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971) (en banc); Serrano
v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929 (Cal.) (en banc) Serrano v. Priest, cert. denied 432 U.S.
907 (1977); Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359 (Conn. 1977); Sheff v. OwNeill, 609
A.2d 1072 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1992); McDuffy v. Secretary of the Executive Office
of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516 (Mass. 1993); Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359 (N.J.
1990); Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973); Robinson v. Cahill, 355
A.2d 129 (N.J. 1976) (per curiam); Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777
S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989), 804 S.W.2d 491 (Tex. 1991). These cases held school
funding systems unconstitutional but failed to provide adequate remedies-as
evidenced by the cases' return to the courts and multiple challenges to school
funding schemes in these states.
113. See Note, Unfulfilled Promises: School Finance Remedies and State
Courts, 104 HARv. L. REV. 1072 (1991) [hereinafter Unfulfilled Promises]
(describing myriad of problems associated with devising school finance remedies and finding that many state courts have failed to provide victorious plaintiffs with adequate remedies).
114. See, e.g., Hornbeck, 458 A.2d at 764-65. The Hornbeck court cited
plaintiffs' complaint describing the particular educational disadvantages of impoverished children in the poor, urban districts and discussing the problems
associated with "municipal overburden." Id; see also R.E.F.I.T, 578 N.Y.S.2d at
972 (acknowledging funding disparities of 100 to 1 between rich and poor districts, focusing on urban poor as receiving lowest quality education).
115. See Hornbeck, 458 A.2d at 790 (upholding highly disparate funding system in order to give deference to state legislature and local school districts);
R.E.F.I.T., 578 N.Y.S.2d at 976 (stating that educational funding problems of
the inner-cities must be left for legislature to solve).
116. R.E.F.I.T., 578 N.Y.S.2d at 972; see also supra note 28 (describing overcrowded and decrepit portable classrooms where some urban New York chil-
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proper grade levels due to poor educational facilities and lack of
special services for the many high-risk students who reside in
these areas. 117 In Reform Education FinanceInequities Today
v. Cuomo,118 however, poor school districts lost their constitutional challenge to the state's school funding system. 119 The Superior Court of New York conceded that New York's funding
system was inadequate, 20 and stressed the problems of the urban poor who "need a special supportive educational effort in order to give them the chance to succeed as citizens and
workers." 12 ' Despite the court's rhetoric, however, it upheld the
funding scheme, relying upon 2New
York precedent 122 and defer3
ence to the state legislature.
Most state courts which have taken the initiative to strike
their states' school finance systems have then assumed passive
roles in implementing remedies 124 due to jurisprudential concerns. 12 5 Even when courts have boldly defined their state's
constitutional right to education, 12 6 legislative deadlock 127 has
dren must attend school); KOZOL, supra note 1, at 83-132 (devoting an entire
chapter to "Savage Inequalities" of public schools in poor urban New York and
stressing that nowhere is denial of tools for success "more explicit or more absolute than in the public schools of New York City").
117. R.E.F.I.T., 578 N.Y.S.2d at 971-73.
118. Id. at 969.
119. Id. at 976.
120. Id. at 972.
121. Id. at 975. The court went on to lament that legislative initiatives regarding "the urgent need for reform fall on deaf ears." Id. at 974.
122. Levittown Union Free Sch. Dist. v. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d 359 (N.Y.), appeal dismissed, 459 U.S. 1138 (1982) (dismissing challenge of school finance
disparities which were less pronounced than those of 1991).
123. R.E.F.I.T., 578 N.Y.S.2d at 976.
124. See McDuffy v. Secretary of Exec. Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 55456 (Mass. 1993). The McDuffy court held the state's school funding system unconstitutional and listed guidelines which the legislature should consider when
drafting a new financing system. Id. at 554. The court explicitly stated, however, that the Massachusetts legislature has discretion to define the precise educational duty of the schools and to devise a funding plan which complies with
the "constitutional mandate-without giving the term substantive meaning.
Id. at 555-56; see also Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 399
(Tex. 1989) (stating that it is not court's duty to "instruct the legislature as to
the specifics of the legislation it should enact" but that court must decide "the
nature of the constitutional mandate and whether that mandate has been
met").
125. See Unfulfilled Promises, supra note 113, at 1082-85 (explaining that
many courts refrain from ordering explicit remedies in school finance cases because of separation of powers and judicial deference to legislative decisions).
126. See Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359, 408-11 (N.J. 1990) (defining remedy
in fairly concrete terms and ordering that school funding could not depend on
districts' taxing abilities).
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failed to provide the judicially mandated remedy.128 When
courts refuse to confront or fail to remedy discriminatory funding schemes, students have no recourse to remedy their lack of
quality education.
b.

Lack of Uniformity in State Constitutional Analysis

Courts often rely on state constitutional education provisions in striking down unequal financing schemes, 12 9 claiming
that the particular language of that constitution requires a minimum threshold of adequate or equal education. 13 0 In reality,
however, the particular wording of a state's constitutional provision does not control the outcome in such situations. 13 1 The resulting ad hoc analysis in state courts prevents the
establishment of uniformity or regularity.
In both New Jersey 13 2 and Ohio,1 3 3 for example, impoverished urban school districts challenged the states' funding
127. See Unfulfilled Promises, supra note 113, at 1078-79 (explaining how
legislatures fail to provide adequate remedies due to political power of wealthier constituents and citizens' unwillingness to pay higher taxes to help raise
needed funds); see also Herbert, supra note 16 (describing situation in Michigan
where legislature has repealed the entire financing system but has not been
able to devise alternative plan).
128. See Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359, 363-65 (N.J. 1990) (explaining that
New Jersey Supreme Court had found state's school funding scheme unconstitutional in Robinson v. Cahill, 351 A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975); then holding, in Abbott,
legislature's amended financing scheme unconstitutional as applied to poor urban school districts); Jerry Gray, Ruling Puts New Jersey at Center of SchoolFinancingIssue in U.S., N.Y. TmEs, Sept. 2, 1993, at A14 (reporting that in
unpublished opinion, Superior Court in New Jersey recently held state's school
finance plan unconstitutional for fourth time in 20 years); see also Lawrence 0.
Picus & Linda Hertert, Three Strikes and You're Out: Texas School Finance
After Edgewood III, 18 J. EDUC. FINANCE 366 (1993) (explaining how Texas
courts found its state's school financing unconstitutional for third time and once
again state legislature must attempt to remedy inequity).
129. See generally Molly McUsic, The Use of Education Clauses in School
FinanceReform Litigation,28 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 307 (1991) (explaining methods of attack under state constitutional education provisions); William E. Thro,
Note, To Render Them Safe: The Analysis of State ConstitutionalProvisionsin
Public School Finance Reform Litigation, 75 VA. L. REV. 1639 (1989) (again
describing state courts' analysis of education provisions of state constitutions).
130. See, e.g., Dupree v. Alma Sch. Dist. No. 30, 651 S.W.2d 90, 93 (Ark.
1983) (finding that education provision requires "equal educational opportunity"); Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273, 294 (N.J. 1973) (holding that education
clause requires substantial equality in educational outcome).
131. See Johnathon Banks, Note, State ConstitutionalAnalyses of Public
School Finance Reform Cases: Myth or Methodology?, 45 VAND. L. REv. 129,
153 (1992) (arguing that outcomes of school finance cases are unpredictable and
do not coincide with wording of individual education articles).
132. Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359 (N.J. 1990).
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schemes under identical constitutional provisions requiring
"thorough and efficient" school systems.'3 4 The Ohio Supreme
Court upheld its state's funding system and found that the
"thorough and efficient" mandate granted the legislature nearly
135
unbridled discretion in formulating a school funding scheme.
In contrast, the New Jersey Supreme Court interpreted "thorough and efficient" to require "equal educational opportunity"
and held that its funding system violated this constitutional
36
edict.'
c.

Failure to Address the Plight of Poor Urban Schools

Inner-city students face the most egregious economic and
social problems 3 7 and have the greatest need for educational
opportunities to help them escape the cycle of poverty,138 yet
they receive the lowest quality education.'1 9 Most state courts,
however, analyze school funding disparities with a generalized
approach under state constitutional education provisions,' 40 and
fail to identify the particular plight of the poor, urban student.
Moreover, strict adhesion to traditional equal protection review
prevents the courts from acknowledging these students' unique
circumstances.
i. Review under state constitutions' education
requirements
McDuffy v. Secretary of Education,14 1 exemplifies a state
court decision that analyzed school finance disparities on a
statewide basis under the education provision of the state constitution, thus failing to respond directly to the deficiencies of
the inner-city schools. 14 2 In McDuffy, the trial court described
133. Board of Educ. v. Walter, 390 N.E.2d 813 (Ohio 1979), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 1015 (1980).
134. Abbott, 575 A.2d at 363 n.1; Walter, 390 N.E.2d at 815.
135. Walter, 390 N.E.2d at 825.
136. Robinson, 303 A.2d at 294, 298.
137. See supra notes 32-40 and accompanying text (describing crime, violence, racial strife, and poor family conditions in impoverished central city
areas).
138. See supra note 41 and accompanying text (stressing importance of
quality education to enable children in concentrated poverty areas to break cycle of poverty).
139. See supra notes 44-47, 51-55, and accompanying text (describing that
as compared with all other schools, inner-city schools have highest costs and
least funds to cover those costs).
140. See supra notes 129-130 and accompanying text.
141. 615 N.E.2d 516 (Mass. 1993).
142. Id.
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the inadequacies of Massachusetts' schools, focusing on overcrowded classes, 14 3 unsafe buildings,'4 and other conditions associated with poor inner-city schools.' 4 5 The reviewing court
held the financing scheme unconstitutional 14 6 but failed to directly address the fact that the worst educational situations existed in the urban areas.' 4 7 The court ordered a weak,
generalized remedy which ignored inner-city problems such as
municipal overburden 48 and granted wide discretion to the
Massachusetts legislature to define the state constitutional
49
requirements.'
In contrast, the New Jersey Supreme Court in Abbott v.
Burke,' 50 the only state court to take a bold position under its
state constitution,' 5 ' ordered a progressive remedy that confronted the unique disadvantages of the urban poor. 152 Because
poor urban children did not receive "equal educational opportunities" as compared to children in the rest of the state, the court
held the state's funding system unconstitutional only as applied
to the poor, inner-city districts. 153 The court then ordered the
legislature to reform school financing in order to provide each
poor, urban district with "a budget per pupil that [was] approximately equal to the average of the richer suburban districts...
143. Id. at 521.
144. Id. at 521 n.13.
145. Id. at 521. The court describes the inadequacies of the "typical" impoverished schools in terms of urban problems. Id. at 520-21, 521 n.13. For example, one school provided "inadequate services" for the 43 homeless children in
its system, another school could not meet the guidance needs of "its unusually
diverse population and large percentage of at-risk students." Id.
146. Id. at 519. The plaintiffs in McDuffy did not argue for equalized educational spending, but did claim that all students are entitled to an adequate education. Id. at 522.
147. The court described the plaintiffs' schools as located in "towns and cities," and made no specific references to the urban plight. Id. at 519-20. The
court also failed to view the issue in terms of equal protection, and relied entirely on the education article of the state's constitution. Id. at 519.
148. The McDuffy court merely listed some guidelines for the legislature to
consider when devising a financing scheme which would provide all students
with an "adequate" education. Id. at 554-56.
149. See supra note 124 (describing McDuffy court's reluctance to order a
definite remedy due to its deference to the state legislature).
150. 575 A-2d 359 (N.J. 1990).
151. The Abbott court decided the issue under the education article of the
state's constitution, although the reasoning seems to encompass an equal protection theme that all should receive equal treatment-an equitable standard of
education. Abbott, 575 A.2d at 408-410.
152. Id.
153. Id.
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and [was] sufficient to address their special needs. "15 4 Despite
the court's progressive holding, however, the New Jersey legislature has failed to fulfill the court's mandate.' 55
ii. Review under traditional equal protection analysis
Courts fail to address the plight of the urban poor not only
through analysis of school finance cases under the state constitutions' education clauses, but also through strict adhesion to
traditional equal protection review.'5 6 While some courts ignore 157 or do not reach the issue 58 of equal protection in cases
regarding school funding inequities, those courts that focus on
equal protection as the basis for decision' 5 9 generally adhere to
154. Id. at 409. The court found that school funding must not rely on local
taxing and required that financing remain stable from year to year. Id. at 408;
see also Gray, supra note 128, at A14. Most recently, the Superior Court ofNew
Jersey found that the urban (also the poorest) school districts in New Jersey
received 5% more state funds than the other districts, and held that this was
not sufficient. Abbott, 575 A.2d at 408. Using a complicated formula, the judge
found that the state must provide at least 24% more aid to the poorest districts
in order to comply with constitutional mandates. Id.
155. See supra note 128 (describihg several constitutional challenges to New
Jersey's financing scheme and reporting that inner-city districts have recently
launched another constitutional attack on continuing inadequacies).
156. The one exception was the unanimous court in Washakie County
School District No. 1 v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 333-34 (Wyo. 1980), which took
a novel approach similar to that followed by the United States Supreme Court
in Plyler v. Doe , 457 U.S. 202, reh'g denied, 458 U.S. 1131 (1982); see supra text
accompanying notes 101-102 (describing equal protection analysis employed by
the Court in Plyler which examined interest affected in conjunction with disadvantages of complaining class). This was a more aggressive position in that
most courts either did not address the suspect classification issue or found
wealth not to be suspect. The Herschler court did not view wealth independently for suspect class analysis, but examined wealth in terms of its effect on
education. 606 P.2d at 333-34. It found wealth to be a suspect classification
"especially" because it affected a fundamental interest. Id. at 334. The court,
therefore, focused on the reality that classifications based on wealth which affect quality of education are especially devastating for poor children
157. See Blase v. State, 302 N.E.2d 46 (Ill. 1973); Abbott, 575 A.2d at 359;
Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989) (Edgewood1);
Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 804 S.W.2d 491 (Tex. 1991) (Edgewood 1H).
158. McDuffy v. Secretary of the Executive Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516,
555 (Mass. 1993) (concluding that Massachusetts's constitution imposes enforceable duty on state to provide education for all children).
159. See Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971) (en banc); (Serrano1),
557 P.2d 929 (Cal.) (en banc) Serrano v. Priest, cert. denied, 432 U.S. 907 (1977)
(SerranoII) (holding school financing system unconstitutional under the state
equal protection clause).
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the traditional approach, 160 under which courts view factors in
isolation' 6 1 to decide whether education is a fundamental inter16 2
est or whether wealth is a suspect class.
Courts that are willing to invalidate their states' school
funding schemes generally find education to be a fundamental
interest 16 3 due to its inclusion in their state's constitution.164 In
finding education to be a fundamental interest, however, courts
do not address the urban poor as a unique group. 1 65 Unfortunately, state courts have also failed to address the unique combination of urban poverty and inferior education through suspect

160. See, e.g., SerranoII, 557 P.2d at 951 (determining initially that education is fundamental interest and wealth is suspect classification under state
constitution).
161. See supra text accompanying notes 57-60 (describing traditional approach which United States Supreme Court followed in Rodriguez).
162. See supra text accompanying notes 57-60. Still other courts apply a
rational basis standard and hold unequal funding schemes unconstitutional
under state equal protection analysis without reaching the issues of whether
education is a fundamental right or wealth is a suspect class. See Tennessee
Small Sch. Sys. v. McWherter, 851 S.W.2d 139, 152-56 (Tenn. 1993). The defendants argued that the need for local control of education provided a rational
basis for the unequal funding. Id. at 154. The court held this argument invalid
because funding equalization does not harm local control, and poor districts actually gain more local control over education when they have sufficient funds.
Id. at 155. Affirming the lower court's rationale, the Tennessee Supreme Court
held the school funding disparities unconstitutional under equal protection rational basis review. Id.
163. A court that is willing to invalidate a school financing system generally
holds education to be a fundamental interest under its state constitution. See,
e.g., Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359, 373-75 (Conn. 1977) (finding education to
be fundamental interest and holding state school financing systems unconstitutional); Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 878-79 (W.Va. 1979) (same); Washakie
County Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 333-37 (Wyo. 1980) (same).
164. Almost all state constitutions have specific constitutional provisions for
a right to education. McUsic, supra note 129, at 311. Thus applying the
Supreme Court's analysis on a state level, state courts often find education to
be a fundamental right. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 1, 33-34 (1973) (stating fundamental interests are those rights implicitly
or explicitly provided for in Constitution). States also stress the importance of
education to the future of the nation. See, e.g., McDuffy v. Secretary of the Executive Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 535-37 (Mass. 1993) (outlining history
of Massachusetts' constitutional provision for education and describing framers'
strong belief that education was "integral to the very existence of a republican
government).
165. See supra note 140-149 and accompanying text (describing how a court
viewed educational deficiencies in general terms under education clause of
state constitution).
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class analysis, 16 6 because courts again view factors in
16 7
isolation.
Federal courts have not addressed the school finance issue
since San Antonio Independent School Districtv. Rodriguez, and
many state courts have failed to provide a remedy for poor in1 68
ner-city children who do not receive a quality education.
Among state courts which have confronted the problem, there
has been a great lack of uniformity and a failure to recognize the

particularly deep-rooted travails affecting students in the poor

urban schools. 169 The lack of action in either state legislatures
or courts has left many inner-city children without sufficient educational opportunities.' 7 0 Without a comprehensive federal
remedy, these children have no recourse.
III.

PROPOSAL FOR A FEDERAL REMEDY-A
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK WHICH
ADDRESSES THE PLIGHT OF POOR
URBAN SCHOOLS

Because impoverished, urban school children have been unable to attain an adequate remedy at the state level, 17 1 the
school funding issue should ultimately return to the federal
courts with a focus on the particular plight of the urban poor.
Over twenty years have passed since San Antonio Independent
166. See, e.g., Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299, 301-02 (Minn. 1993) (finding
education to be fundamental right but holding wealth not suspect class because
there was no proof of history of unequal treatment or lack of political power
among plaintiff districts).
167. See Lujan v. Colorado State Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005, 1017-19 (Colo.
1982) (en banc); McDaniel v. Thomas, 285 S.E.2d 156, 167 (Ga. 1981); Hornbeck
v. Somerset County Bd. of Educ., 458 A.2d 758, 786-87 (Md. 1983); Kukor v.
Grover, 436 N.W.2d 568, 578-79 (Wis. 1989) (analyzing poverty in isolation and
finding that wealth is not suspect class); cf SerranoII, 557 P.2d 929, 951 (Cal.
1977) (en banc) (viewing wealth in isolation but finding it to create suspect classification alone). But see Herchler,606 P.2d at 334 (analyzing effect inadequate
education has on impoverished children in deciding that wealth is suspect
classification).
168. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
169. See supra notes 113, 131 and accompanying text; and text accompanying note 140.
170. See supra notes 116-123 and accompanying text (describing situation in
New York where judicial and legislative inaction has left inner-city students
with meaningless educations).
171. See supra notes 109, 111 and accompanying text (describing how courts
have failed to provide remedy in many states, causing lack of uniformity in educational opportunities available in public schools throughout nation).
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School District v. Rodriguez,1' 2 and the educational situation in
the inner-cities has declined considerably.' 7 3 Although the federal courts are not currently receptive to school finance claims,
only a federal remedy can ensure quality education for the urban disadvantaged and thereby provide an escape for these innocent children.174 At minimum, inner-city students should
challenge school finance inequities in state courts under the
novel equal protection approach of Plyler v. Doe 17 5 in order to
address their unique situation and create support for an ap76
proach which could ultimately prevail on the federal level.'
A. THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE SHOULD APPLY TO
INVALiDATE DISPARATE FUNDING SCHEMES WHICH

DENY EQUAL

EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITIES FOR

POOR URBAN STUDENTS

Poor urban school districts should present their unique situation of school funding disparities,' 77 coupled with pronounced
educational needs,' 7 8 on the theory of Plyler. This proposal demands that courts apply heightened scrutiny under state and
federal equal protection analysis when confronting discrimination against the inner-city poor in their quality of education. Because the government has a substantial interest in training
children to be useful participants in a democratic society, the
courts would hold the discrimination unconstitutional.

172. See supra notes 65-71 and accompanying text (explaining reasoning
and holding of Rodriguez).
173. See KOZOL, supra note 1, at 223 (stating that in 1991, "[in San Antonio,
where Demetrio Rodriguez brought his suit against the state in 1968, the children of the poor still go to separate and unequal schools").
174. See supra part II.B. (describing inability of state courts to create uniform and adequate remedy for urban poor).

175. 457 U.S. 202, 216-24 (1982).
176. See infra part HI.B. (explaining how federal precedent supports
approach).
177. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text (describing great funding
disparities between rich and poor districts); notes 51-55 and accompanying text
(explaining effects of municipal overburden and focusing on resulting lack of
school funding in poor urban school districts).
178. See supra part I.A. (describing special needs of children who live in concentrated poverty areas, and explaining need for education to help children escape cycle of poverty).

1994]

URBAN SCHOOLS

1663

1. Why Heightened Scrutiny Is Appropriate for Poor Urban
Students per Plyler
Although the United States Supreme Court has not declared poverty1 7 9 a suspect class,' 8 0 poor urban students constitute a definable group of poor within Plyler because of their
unique social, economic, and political situation.' 8 ' Moreover,
although the Plyler Court did not find that Hispanic illegal
aliens comprise a suspect class,' 8 2 it nonetheless applied
heightened scrutiny to their denial of education because the discrimination created "special disabilities upon groups disfavored
by virtue of circumstances beyond their control." 83 The Court
stressed the special circumstances of children born into an underclass and found that to punish them-essentially for their
birth-would produce
a result contrary to "fundamental concep84
tions of justice."
Similarly, poor urban students should enjoy special constitutional protection from the denial of a meaningful education because disparate school funding unfairly discriminates against
them and burdens them with a great competitive disadvantage. 85 Inequitable financing discriminates against inner-city
students simply because they live in concentrated poverty areas,
which is a situation beyond the children's control. Indeed the
unequal contest among students caused by disparate financing
resembles a "tainted sports event," fixed for the urban poor to
179. But see Menacker, supra note 25, at 1093-98 (arguing that poverty
should be considered suspect classification for federal equal protection review).
This Note's proposal differs from Dr. Menacker's in that it does not argue that
poverty alone is a suspect class. Instead, this Note shows that the urban poor
comprise a definable category of poor who suffer distinct disadvantages, and
because discrimination in educational quality amplifies those disadvantages,
the discrimination should be treated with heightened scrutiny.
180. Supra note 70 and accompanying text; San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-34, reh'g denied, 411 U.S. 959 (1973).
181. See supra Part IA (describing social, economic, and educational disadvantages of inner-city students).
182. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 202 (1982); see also supra notes 91, 99-100
and accompanying text (explaining the Plyler decisions' treatment of suspect
class analysis).
183. Plyler,457 U.S. at 217 n.14.
184. Id. at 219-20.
185. See supra note 121 and accompanying text (describing R.E.F.LT.
court's acknowledgement that poor urban students need special educational
support in order to compete with students from wealthier areas, yet disadvantaged children receive inadequate and unequal education).
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lose.1 8 6 7 Most tragically, these children cannot replay the
18
game.
Although the Supreme Court in Plyler stated that education
does not rise to the level of a fundamental right under the federal constitution,1 8 8 the Court applied heightened scrutiny to
the illegal aliens' denial of education because education plays a
fundamental role in a democratic society,'8 9 and because denying education would marginalize these children from all political
and economic participation in society. 190 Whereas Plyler involved complete denial of free education,' 9 ' states do not entirely
deny education to urban poor. Nevertheless, inner-city children
circumreceive blatantly defective schooling which in many
92
stances creates a functional denial of education.
Moreover, the Plyler Court focused on the creation of a discrete underclass as the primary reason that denial of education
to illegal aliens was unconstitutional. 193 Defective urban education perpetuates the same political and economic marginalization in the inner-city 94 that the Court feared complete denial of
education would cause among the illegal aliens in Plyler. The
inability of the impoverished urban citizens to bring about the
repeal of disparate fimding systems through the state legislatures provides a compelling example of their lack of political
power.' 9 5 Their marginalization becomes greatly amplified because poor urban children receive the lowest quality educa-

186. See KozoL, supra note 1, at 180 (using metaphor of "tainted sports
event").
187. See id. (stressing "terrible finality" of unequal education due to inability to replay one's childhood).
188. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 221; see supra note 90 and accompanying text.
189. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
190. See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text.
191. See supra note 98 and accompanying text (describing concurrences by
Justices Powell and Blackmun which explain that Plyler involves complete denial of education).
192. See supra notes 22-23, 26-30, and accompanying text (describing egregious situations in many urban schools).
193. Supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text.
194. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text (describing cycle of poverty which infects urban underclass).
195. See Kosterlitz, supranote 4, at 1769-70 (explaining difficulty of passing
funding equalization legislation because wealthy exert more influence than
those most disadvantaged by status quo); supra notes 115-123, 127 and accompanying text (describing legislative deadlock which forecloses educational improvement for urban poor, especially when courts will not provide remedy).
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skills
tion,196 denying them the educational and vocational
1 97
necessary for meaningful participation in society.
Because the urban poor suffer unique disadvantages and
because education is essential to prevent the groups' continued
marginalization, courts should apply heightened scrutiny to
funding discrimination. Independently, the urban poor do not
constitute a suspect class, and education is not a fundamental
interest. When, however, a state exacerbates the particular disadvantages of urban poverty by allowing discrimination in the
quality of education' 98 available to the inner-city poor, equal
protection demands heightened scrutiny. 199
2. Disparate Funding of Poor Inner-City Schools Does Not
Serve a "Substantial Goal"20 0 and Therefore Fails
to Survive Heightened Scrutiny
As in Rodriguez,2 0 1 states often claim that increased local
control over education provides a "legitimate"20 2 or "substantial"20 3 state interest which flows from disparate fuMding be-

cause such. financing mechanisms allow residents of each
district to determine the level of local taxes that they will devote
to their schools. 20 4 The argument for local control does not pro196. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text (noting educational crisis
which falls most heavily on urban poor).
197. The court in Abbott v. Burke described the urban poor as "doubly mistreated: first, by the accident of their environment and, second, by the disadvantage added by an inadequate education." 575 A.2d 359, 403 (N.J. 1990).
198. See supra notes 42-50 and accompanying text (explaining that this discrimination in educational quality is due to unequal and inadequate funding).
199. See supra note 102 and accompanying text. Courts should apply
heightened scrutiny, as it was applied to the illegal aliens in Plyler, when the
state places an underclass at an extreme disadvantage for reasons beyond their
control.
200. See supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text (describing heightened
scrutiny analysis per Plyler which requires court to find that discriminatory
law furthers "substantial state goal" in order for court to uphold it).
201. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 48-55, reh'gdenied, 411 U.S. 959 (1973); see supra note 71. The argument for local control
withstood rationalbasis equal protection review of the "adequate"school financing system in Rodriguez but the argument would be too weak to withstand
heightened scrutiny, especially when applied to the many inner-city schools
which are inadequate.

202. See supra note 162 (presenting state argment that local control is "legitimate" state interest).
203. See Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929, 953 (Cal.) (en banc), cert. denied,
432 U.S. 907 (1977) (rejecting state's argument for local control as "substantial"
state interest under strict scrutiny equal protection review).
204. See supra note 42 and accompanying text (stating that states base
school funding primarily on local property taxes).

1666

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 78:1639

vide even a legitimate state interest in the case of poor urban
districts,20 5 because these districts with exaggerated needs lack
sufficient funds to have any meaningful control. 20 6 Local control
therefore fails to provide a "substantial state goal" to satisfy
heightened scrutiny analysis of discrimination in the education
of urban poor. At the least, to the extent Plyler offers scrutiny
which balances competing interests,20 7 the goal of local control
would fail to supersede the overriding state interest in educating
children for participation in a democratic society and in providing the urban poor with skills necessary to aid them in their escape from the urban underclass.
The Plyler Court espoused the government's overriding interest in preventing illegal aliens from becoming a marginalized
underclass. 20 8 The federal government, therefore, has an even
greater interest in aiding American citizens in breaking away
from government assistance and becoming productive members
of society. 20 9 As the Supreme Court stated in Plyler, "[i]t is difficult to understand precisely what the State hopes to achieve by
promoting the creation and perpetuation of a subclass of illiterates within our boundaries, surely adding to the problems and
costs of unemployment, welfare, and crime." 2 10 The federal interest in providing an adequate education in order to prevent
the persistence of the urban underclass would therefore prevail
over the goal of local control, and discriminatory school funding
would be held unconstitutional.
205. Many states no longer adhere to this argument. See, e.g., supra note
162 (describing Tennessee case in which local control did not provide a rational
basis for equal protection review of a disparate funding scheme).
206. See supra notes 44-45 (describing how impoverished districts cannot
generate sufficient funds for rudimentary education, let alone needed services);
see also Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, at 83, 84 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (exclaiming:
"[i]t is an inescapable fact that if one district has more funds available per pupil
than another district, the former will have greater choice in educational planning than will the latter").
207. See supra notes 93, 96, and accompanying text (explaining how in applying heightened scrutiny, the Court "balanced" state interest involved with
hardship suffered by complainants).
208. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 230, reh'g denied, 458 U.S. 1131 (1982)
(stating that federal interest in providing illegal aliens with education was to
prevent them from adding to "problems and costs of unemployment, welfare,
and crime"); see also supra note 96 and accompanying text.
209. See Henry & Welch, supra note 7, at 7. Poor educational programming
in the inner-cities costs states billions of dollars. Id. For example, high school
dropouts (with the largest percentage of dropouts in the central city) "cost
America $240 billion in lost earnings and forgone taxes over their lifetimes."
Id.
210. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 230.
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WITH PRE-EXISTING CASE LAW

As described above, this Note's proposal fits neatly within
the holding of Plyler v. Doe.2 11 Other federal precedents, like
San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,2 12 support, or at least do not foreclose, this Note's proposal. Indeed,
the proposal benefits from the United States Supreme Court's
2 13
repeated espousals confirming the importance of education,
and from the Court's democratic theory of the Equal Protection
2 14
Clause first announced in Carolene Products.
Although the equal protection proposal advanced in this
Note may appear to conflict with Rodriguez,21 5 upon closer analysis the decision allows for the proposal. Rodriguez left unanswered whether the Constitution provides a right to some
minimum threshold of education. 2 16 The Supreme Court would
have the opportunity to address this issue through a federal constitutional challenge to disparate financing schemes in poor urban schools, because many of17these schools fail to offer a
2
minimally adequate education.
An equal protection challenge based on the Plyler theory
would also comply with the Rodriguez analysis because impoverished, urban children comprise a "definable category of 'poor'
people." 2 18 The Rodriguez plaintiffs provided no "definitive description" or "delineation" of their class. 2 1 9 They simply represented a general, amorphous pool of poor persons. Indeed, the
Rodriguez Court seemed to invite an equal protection challenge
to a discriminatory school funding scheme which burdens a de220
finable group of poor.
The urban poor comprise a distinguishable category of poor
who suffer particular disadvantages which impoverished per211.
212.
213.
view in

See supra part HI.
411 U.S. 1 (1973).
See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text (explaining the Court's
Brown v. Board of Educ. that all are entitled to education "on equal

terms").
214. See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
215. See supra notes 66-71 and accompanying text (explaining why the Rodriguez plaintiffes did not obtain a federal remedy).
216.

See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.

217. See, e.g., Reform Educ. Fin. Inequities Today (R.E.F.I.T.) v. Cuomo, 578
N.Y.S.2d 969, 973 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991) (presenting plaintiffs' argument that
many urban districts offer inadequate educational opportunities but state court
fails to identify "minimum standard" with which each school must comply).
218. Rodrguez, 411 U.S. at 25; see supra note 83 and accompanying text.
219. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 19; see supra note 84 and accompanying text.
220. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
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sons elsewhere do not experience. 221 Uniquely urban problems
of violence, ethnic strife, and overcrowded classrooms require
expensive special services for inner-city students.2 22 Low funding levels make it nearly impossible to pay for such programs,
let alone provide for basic education. 2 23 To further add to the
urban educational malaise, municipal overburden soaks up local
property tax funds, leaving little money for basic educational
needs. 2 24 These factors converge to create the distinguishable
condition of the impoverished inner-city students.
Above all, the argument for the urban poor rests on the purpose of the Equal Protection Clause "to work nothing less than
the abolition of all caste-based and invidious class-based legislation."2 2 5 Disparate school funding systems are "caste-based."
Low-quality education compounds other disadvantages of the inner-city children, and excludes them from political and economic
participation.
The United States Supreme Court confirmed that the basis
of the Equal Protection Clause lies in protecting the politically
2 26
powerless from those who have disproportionate influence.
The urban poor lack political power as evidenced by their inability to eliminate disparate funding systems.2 2 7 Moreover, the
scant power they have retained will disappear if disparate funding prevents inner-city children from gaining the educational
skills they need to become political contenders.
Educational disparities aside, the urban poor find competing politically with the wealthy very difficult.2 28 The state must
offer quality education in the inner-cities to diminish one disad221. See supra part I.A. (describing how central city schools offer lowest
quality education, negatively affecting children most in need of education to
help them escape from deteriorating urban landscape).
222. See supra notes 30, 32-34 and accompanying text (describing bleak situation inner-city students face).
223. See supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text (explaining how fimding
systems based on local property taxes cause disparities, and how usually impoverished areas of central cities are those most unable to raise sufficient funds).
224. See supra notes 47, 51-55 and accompanying text.
225. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 213 (1982).
226.

See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.

227. See supra notes 121, 127-128 and accompanying text (noting inability
of inner-city poor to cause repeal of inequitable financing schemes).
228. The Supreme Court has acknowledged that the wealthy wield disproportionate political power over the poor. See supra note 81 (explaining
Supreme Court holding in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S.
652 (1990), recognizing overwhelming political influence of wealthy and upholding constraints on political speech in order to contain this disproportionate
power).
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vantage of urban poverty, and provide one area in which the ur22 9
ban poor can begin on equal footing with the rest of society.
As the Court announced: "all persons similarly circumstanced
shall be treated alike."230 The underlying purpose of the Equal

Protection Clause and past federal precedents thus bolster the
argument for the inner-city poor.
C.

APPLICATION OF THE PROPOSAL TO ENSURE A UNIFORM
REMEDY FOR ALL POOR INNER-CITY STUDENTS

The equal protection proposal per Plyler would best address
the plight of the inner-city poor if applied on a federal level.
Uniform application of the proposal on a state level, however,
could provide remedies sensitive to the unique disadvantages of
urban students and create a basis for an ultimate federal remedy. Many issues surround determining the most appropriate
remedy to ensure a meaningful education for the urban poor,
and a complete discussion of these issues would transcend this
Note's scope. 2 31 The key aspect of an ultimate federal remedy,
however, lies in the creation of a uniform, national mandate that
states provide all children, including impoverished inner-city
23 2
students, with a meaningful public education.
A comprehensive remedy first requires that the courts hold
disparate and inadequate school funding systems unconstitutional as applied to poor urban students.23 3 Next, like the New
Jersey Supreme Court in Abbott v. Burke,23 4 courts could require state legislatures to provide adequate funding for impoverished, inner-city districts-funding which is not dependent on
local property taxes. 23 5 Also essential for a full remedy is that
229. See supra note 186 and accompanying text (comparing disparate funding systems with "tainted sports event"). States could help remedy the "tainted
sports event" with equalized funding.
230. F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920).
231. See supra note 113, 115, 124-125 and accompanying text (describing
problems that state courts have encountered in devising remedies, including
separation of powers concerns). A full discussion of federal court remedies for
school finance reform involves a myriad of political issues and ventures beyond
the scope of this Note.
232. State officials could delineate exactly what comprises a "meaningful education," using objective criteria. Meanwhile, the federal government could establish performance goals and require the states to show improvement in order
to receive federal funding.
233. See supra part I-A (explaining how plaintiff school districts should
challenge school funding disparities under Plyler theory).
234. See supra notes 150-154 and accompanying text.
235. See supra part I.B. (describing how school funding based on local property taxes results in low-quality education for inner-city children).
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states adjust financing levels for the higher costs of the innercity2 3 6 and ensure sufficient funding to provide urban children
with needed services. 2 37 Courts could reserve to state legislatures the power to devise plans appropriate for their states,
which comply with the courts' mandate. 238 Although the current Supreme Court may not welcome school finance challenges,
ultimately this Note's proposal could provide a federal remedy
for inner-city students which would create awareness and involvement on a national level. Courts' initiatives would force
the federal government to supplement their rhetoric 239 with real
action for the future of impoverished urban children. These children can no longer patiently await an "ultimate 'political' solution sometime in the indefinite future while, in the meantime,
[they] unjustifiably receive inferior educations that 'may affect
2 40
their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone.'"
CONCLUSION
The inner-city poor suffer the ills of their decaying urban
landscape while states fail to provide them with quality education which would aid them in their escape from the cycle of poverty. Federal courts have not addressed the school finance issue
since San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez in
1973, although Rodriguez clearly did not foreclose a federal remedy. Moreover, state courts have either refused to confront the
issue or have failed to provide comprehensive, uniform remedies
for the inner-city poor. The time is ripe for federal courts to require states to provide urban children with a quality education
so that they "might be able somehow to soar up above the hopelessness, the clouds of smoke and sense of degradation all
24 1
around them."
236. See supra notes 51-55 and accompanying text (describing problems associated with municipal overburden and drain on tax revenues which occurs in
central cities).
237. See supra part LA- (describing heightened needs of urban poor due to
social and economic decay of urban landscape).
238. See supra note 124 and accompanying text (describing how state courts
have been comfortable with school financing remedies that leave details of the
fimding schemes to state legislatures).
239. See supra notes 3-6 and accompanying text (describing how federal government has criticized American education while decreasing federal education
expenditures and failing to develop national standards).
240. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 70, 71-72 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting
Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954)).
241. KozoL, supra note 1, at 41.
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Plyler v. Doe provides a conceptual framework for equal protection analysis at the state level, and ultimately at the federal
level, that addresses the unique disadvantages of inner-city
poor. Using the Plyler framework, courts should apply heightened scrutiny equal protection review to invalidate unequal and
inadequate school funding schemes which discriminate against
poor urban school children. This particular group of children requires heightened constitutional protection to assure them an
education which would end their continued marginalization
from meaningful economic and political participation in American society.

